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Through a Glass Darkly: The Case
Against Pilkington plc. under the
New U.S. Department of Justice
International Enforcement Policy
Jeffrey N. Neuman
Trade and commerce, if they were not made of India-rubber, would never
manage to bounce over the obstacles which legislators are continually put-
ting in their way...
- Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience
I. INTRODUCTION
A complaint and consent decree filed on May 25, 1994 by the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice against Pilk-
ington plc., a British fiat glass manufacturer, is yet another indication
that tough Federal Government antitrust enforcement policy is back
in vogue.' The Government's complaint alleged that Pilkington's
1 United States v. Pilkington plc, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45, 094, at 44, 689 (D. Ariz.
filed May 25, 1994), final judgment entered, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,842 (D. Ariz. 1994).
After settling its case with the Department of Justice, Pilkington was still a defendant in two
actions: PPG Indus., Inc. v. Pilkington plc, 825 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Ariz. 1993) and International
Technology Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington plc, No. 93-552 (D. Ariz. 1993). In PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Pilkington, PPG sought treble damages for Pilkington's alleged violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. After Pilkington's stay to compel arbitration was granted, a U.K. arbitration
panel held against Pilkington. On April 4, 1995, prior to Pilkington's appeal of the arbitration
board's decision to the Arizona district court, the parties jointly moved for dissolution of the
suit. Finally, in International Technology Consultants v. Pilkington, Pilkington and two other
U.S. flat glass manufacturers were alleged to have monopolized and conspired to restrain the
market for float process technology. The plaintiff in that action, ITC, is not itself a manufacturer
of glass. Rather, ITC is an engineering and consulting services company active in the construc-
tion of float process manufacturing facilities. Although the court granted Pilkington's co-de-
fendants' motions for dismissal-Guardian Industries Corporation and AFG Industries, Inc.-
Pilkington and Libby-Owens-Ford Co. remain defendants in the suit.
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overseas technology licensing practices restrained U.S. commerce, re-
sulting in foreclosure of U.S. exports.2 It was the first time since 1982,
and only the second time ever, that the Justice Department had acted
against a foreign concern for conduct which took place wholly outside
of U.S. territory.3 U.S. v. Pilkington plc. was followed in short succes-
sion by the release of new draft Justice Department Guidelines for the
Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property4 and more general
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations;5 both
of which detailed the sorts of activities, whether conducted within the
territorial United States or extraterritorially, that are likely to land a
foreign corporation in trouble with the Antitrust Division. On the
legislative front, the Department was also active in its support of new
legislation designed to facilitate antitrust investigations and lawsuits
against suspected foreign violators of U.S. antitrust laws.6
2 British Glass Manufacturer Settles Case Atiacking Restrictions on U.S. Exporters, 66 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1666, at 617 (June 2, 1994).
3 Those cases were: United States v. C. Itoh & Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010
(W.D. Wash. 1982) (consent decree filed based on DoJ's allegation that eight Japanese trading
companies had fixed prices paid to Alaskan producers of seafood exports to Japan); Daishowa
International v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
See Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yokota, and
"Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERs LJ 821, 836 (1994) (discussing previous paucity of gov-
ernment cases against foreign buyers' cartels whose extraterritorial activities restrained U.S.
exports).
4 The Draft U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisi-
tion of Intellectual Property were released for public comment on August 8, 1994. 67 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No, 1676, at 204 (Aug. 11, 1994). The final guidelines were adopted
and published on April 6,1995. U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Guidelines for the Licens-
ing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property, [hereinafter 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines]
reprinted in 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1708 (Aug. 13,1995). In contrast to past
International Guidelines which combined intellectual property antitrust policy with international
enforcement policy, the Clinton administration decided to publish a separate Intellectual Prop-
erty Guideline because there is "nothing uniquely international about most antitrust issues re-
lated to intellectual property." Diane P. Wood, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Remarks at the Na-
tional Economic Research Associates, Inc.'s Fifteenth Annual Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Seminar, July 7, 1994 at 4 (transcript on file with The Northwestern Journal of International Law
and Business).
5 The Draft Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations were released
for public comment on October 13, 1994. Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 338, part 2, at 39 (Oct.
18, 1994). The final guidelines were adopted and published on April 5, 1995. Antitrust Enforce-
ment Guidelines for International Operations: Issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, reprinted in 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1707 (April
6, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Guidelines].
6 S. 2297, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) and H.R. 4781, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), were
introduced on July 19, 1994. International Antitrust Enforcement Proposed Legislation, Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 326, at 5 (Aug. 2, 1994). H.R. 4781, the International Antitrust Enforce-
ment Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat. 4597) 3647
[hereinafter Enforcement Assistance Act], was signed into law by President Clinton on Novem-
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The case against Pilkington is therefore likely to herald a new age
in antitrust enforcement. The Assistant Attorney General responsible
for antitrust enforcement hailed the Pilkington action as a "paradigm
for how U.S. antitrust enforcement can.. .open export markets previ-
ously closed by anticompetitive practices."7  Indeed, the Pilkington
case and the new enforcement guidelines represent a sea of change for
U.S. extraterritorial antitrust enforcement policy. In the words of the
Attorney General, antitrust enforcement is now a means "to preserve
the ability of American enterprises to compete on fair terms in inter-
national markets for U.S. export business."8 As a matter of dollars
and cents, the government reckoned that its case against Pilkington
was worth $150 million to $1.25 billion in export revenues by the year
2000 for American firms engaged in flat glass export and the construc-
tion of float glass factories overseasf
Moreover, contrary to the earlier claims of some commentators
that the Clinton administration antitrust policy shift would be "largely
symbolic," it now appears that the Justice Department means busi-
ness. 10 During an August 4, 1994 Senate subcommittee hearing in
support of the Enforcement Assistance Act, the Assistant Attorney
General stated that the Antitrust Division has at least 30 major Sher-
man Act section 1 and 2 investigations pending which implicate non-
ber 2, 1994. Enforcement Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-438 at 3669-71. See also President
Signs International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Bill, 341 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 341,
at 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) (thus enabling the Department of Justice to enter into cooperative agree-
ments with their foreign counterparts in order to obtain antitrust evidence outside the U.S.).
The Enforcement Assistance Act aims to facilitate antitrust actions against non-U.S. corpora-
tions by permitting the Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission to share evidence with
foreign antitrust authorities so long as the recipient of such information has signed an "antitrust
mutual assistance agreement." The Clinton administration regarded difficulties in obtaining in-
formation and documents from outside the U.S. as one of the "most significant obstacles" to
greater antitrust enforcement of foreign-owned companies. As a result of the Act's passage, the
Clinton Administration expects that U.S. antitrust officials will now have the "firepower" they
need "to crack down on .... collusion among foreign firms that significantly affects U.S. foreign
and export commerce." Enforcement Clinton Signs Bill to Help Enforcers Obtain Foreign-Lo-
cated Antitrust Evidence, Antitrust Trade Daily (BNA), at D-2 (Nov. 3, 1994).
7 Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Innovation and Anti-
trust, Address Before the Commonwealth Club of California (July 29, 1994) Department of
Justice Press Release at 8 (on file with The Northwestern Journal of International Law and
Business).
8 United States v. Pilkington plc. and Pilkington Holdings Inc., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45, 094, at 44, 689 (D. Ariz. filed May 25, 1994) (the Attorney General was speaking about the
Pilkington case).
9 Bingaman, supra note 7, at 8.
10 Joseph P. Griffin, The Impact of Reconsideration of U.S. Antitrust Policy Intended to Pro-
tect U.S. Exporters, 15 WORLD COMP. L & ECON. REv. 5, 13 (1992).
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U.S. defendants.' That the Department's international activism is
more than a flash in the pan also has been demonstrated by several
other recent enforcement actions: a consent decree with British
Telecom amending a proposed purchase of a twenty percent stake in
MCI Communication;' 2 and, a cooperative enforcement action with
the European Union against Microsoft's worldwide software licensing
practices.1
3
At the core of the Justice Department's case against Pilkington
and the 1995 Guidelines is the question of what constitutes subject
matter jurisdiction. At what point does conduct, undertaken outside
the borders of the U.S., but objectionable according to U.S. antitrust
law, fall within the purview of a U.S. court? Over the past twenty
years, the judiciary and Justice Department's thinking on antitrust
subject matter jurisdiction has gyrated between two extremes. On the
one hand, a belief in strict territoriality implies that jurisdiction should
arise only when the illegal conduct creates immediate U.S. effects such
as increased prices or reduced supply. At the other extreme, an ag-
gressive notion of subject matter jurisdiction supports the U.S.'s right
11 International Antitrust Enforcement - Subcommittee Hearing, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
No. 327, at 3 (Aug. 10, 1994).
12 U.S. v. MCI Communications Corp, 1994-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 70,730 (D.D.C. 1994)
(Proposed consent decree arising from MCI's sale of $4.3 billion of its shares to British
Telecom). The Federal Government was concerned that a planned U.S. joint venture between
the two companies to provide global telecommunications services could have inhibited U.S.
competition because of the joint venture's access to British Telecommunication's (BT's) United
Kingdom network. Hence, in the consent decree, the parties agreed to prohibit discrimination
against U.S. carriers, refrain from sharing proprietary or pricing information regarding U.S. com-
petitors, and cease any efforts to bypass the international telecommunications regulatory regime
and gain access to BT's network until all other carriers can also exempt themselves from restric-
tions currently imposed by international regulation. Bingaman, Briefs Seminar on International
Fronts, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Daily (BNA) No. 67, at d6 (Nov. 10, 1994).
13 U.S. v. Microsoft, Inc, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,764 (D.D.C. 1994) (proposed consent
decree). The Department alleged that Microsoft's licensing agreements with PC manufacturers
effectively blocked competing operating systems from the software market. In particular, the
Government objected to the "per processor" royalty arrangements and other impediments to
competition resulting from the onerous terms of Microsoft's licensing agreements. The Assis-
tant Attorney General saw the cases against Pilkington and Microsoft as two of a kind; both
involved companies which had gained a dominant market position and "then chose to employ
various unlawful practices to cement its dominance and thwart innovation. Bingaman, supra
note 7, at 9. However, unlike the case against Pilkington, the Government's action against
Microsoft had an unhappy ending when a federal court judge rejected the Department's pro-
posed consent decree stating "that the U.S. government is either incapable or unwilling to deal
effectively with a potential threat to this nation's economic well-being." Viveca Novak and Don
Clark, Microsoft Antitrust Pact Rejected by Federal Judge, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1995, at A3.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 16:284 (1995)
to enforce its antitrust laws whenever prohibited overseas conduct
produces any U.S. effect whatsoever.
14
Current Justice Department thinking and practice demonstrates
perhaps the most aggressive approach to subject matter jurisdiction
since the 1960s. However, due to the Department's fondness for con-
sent decrees, neither its extraterritorial enforcement policy nor its
views on subject matter jurisdiction-including the case against Pilk-
ington plc.-have yet been tested in court.' 5 Nevertheless, close at-
tention to the new enforcement policy, as embodied in U.S. v.
Pilkington plc., is warranted. The approach to subject matter jurisdic-
tion which underpins the Department's action against Pilkington
threatens to bring within the embrace of the U.S. federal courts a wide
array of overseas commercial activities conducted by non-U.S. compa-
nies. Indeed, in a private action, a Danish company has recently
brought suit in the Southern District of New York against a European
competitor alleging that anticompetitive conduct in Europe has had
sufficient U.S. domestic effects to warrant U.S. subject matter jurisdic-
tion.16  An influx of unwilling foreign litigants will undoubtedly cause
U.S. courts to re-examine traditional notions of subject matter juris-
diction and could heighten existing trade tensions.
The Department's invigorated international enforcement policy is
also worthy of detailed analysis because it represents a volte face on
14 William F. Baxter, Antitrust in an Interdependent World, in CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ANTrrRUsT, 13, 15 (Joseph P. Griffin ed. 1981).
15 "[A] consent decree is a compromise settlement.. .[n]egotiated by the Justice Department
and the antitrust defendant, it is later ratified as an order of the federal court." Allen Boyer,
Form As Substance: A Comparison of Antitrust Regulation by Consent Decrees in the USA, Re-
ports of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the UK, and Grants of Clearance by the
European Commission, 32 INT'L & Cop. L. Q. 904, 905 (1983). Consent decrees therefore do
not represent a finding of guilt or innocence, merely an agreement by the Justice Department to
cease litigation in exchange for the defendant's promise to terminate the objectionable conduct.
Most significantly, consent decrees allow defendants to escape the effects of § 5 of The Clayton
Act; namely, a finding of liability in a litigated government enforcement action is treated as a
prima facie finding of guilt in subsequent private actions, 15 U.S.C. § 2(5)(a) (1990), whereas a
consent decree implies no guilt. According to Boyer, consent decrees have been the "basic tool
of antitrust enforcement" since the early days of government antitrust enforcement. Id. at 904.
By the early 1980s, nearly 80% of the Department's antitrust suits were being settled by consent
decrees. Id. at 905. Once negotiated, consent decrees must be submitted to a district court for
approval. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (Supp. 1993)(the "Tunney Act"). While court approval has histori-
cally been virtually automatic, United States v. Microsoft, Inc. presents a sharp break with past
practice. See supra note 13.
16 Eskofot A/S v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 93-6137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The dispute
arose after DuPont U.K. repudiated contracts under which the plaintiff, Eskofot, was to import
photographic equipment into the U.S. The court determined that it would have jurisdiction
because of the "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" effects which DuPont's action
would have on the U.S. market. 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 66 (Jan. 19, 1995).
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the enforcement policies pursued by the Reagan-Bush administra-
tions. Arguably, the Department's policy stretches to the limit the
type of conduct which should fall within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
under the "effects" test as embodied in the 1982 Foreign Trade Anti-
trust Improvement Act (FTAIA)17 and case law going back to Judge
Learned Hand's seminal opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America.'
8
An inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction under the 1995 Guide-
lines and in U.S. v. Pilkington, plc. requires a brief examination of the
history of extraterritorial enforcement policy since the mid-1970s.
This is set forth in section II. Next, in section III, the comment ana-
lyzes the ebb and flow of judicial approaches to U.S. antitrust subject
matter jurisdiction, focusing on the pre- and post-FTAIA eras. Sec-
tion IV looks specifically at the 1995 Guideline and the Justice De-
partment's grounds for asserting U.S. subject matter jurisdiction
against Pilkington. In doing so, the comment suggests that in an inter-
dependent global economy, an aggressive jurisdictional philosophy
risks embroiling U.S. courts in disputes involving the competitive
structure of transnational and foreign markets. While guarding U.S.
domestic commerce from the direct spillover effects of international
trade is a well accepted justification for aggressive antitrust enforce-
ment, defending U.S. export opportunities has a "more ambiguous po-
sition in antitrust theory" and seems closer to competition policy and
less like legal theory.19 Finally, in section V, the comment concludes
that if U.S. international antitrust enforcement policy continues on its
present course, it risks becoming a tool of strategic trade policy rather
than a compliable body of public law.
17 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FIAIA) was passed as Title IV of the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 and set forth amendments to the Sherman Act, Clayton
Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. The Sherman Act amendment clarified the test for
when extraterritorial conduct is actionable under U.S. antitrust law. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1982). The FTAIA stipulates that extraterritorial conduct violates U.S.
antitrust law only where there is "a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
U.S. export commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). The House Judiciary Committee Report identi-
fied nearly seven "effects test" which had been applied by U.S. courts. H.R. Rep. No. 686 at 5.
See infra text accompanying notes 74-112.
18 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 1 BARRY E. HAWK, UNrrED STATES COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUSr
A COMPARATrVE GUIDE 170 (2d ed. 1993 Supp.).
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II(A) HISTORY OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY:
OVERVIEW
The Department of Justice, through its Antitrust Division, has ex-
clusive Sherman Act enforcement power and, at its discretion, may
seek either civil or criminal remedies against a would be defendant.20
Given this power, the Antitrust Division has been formally publicizing
its views about when and on what basis the government will pursue
extraterritorial antitrust violators since at least the mid-1950s.
21
Although they constitute neither law nor formal administrative regu-
lation, these enforcement policy utterances began to take the form of
"Guides" or "Guidelines" with the issuance of the first "Antitrust
Guide for International Operations" in 1977,22 followed by a second
Guidelines in 1988,23 and finally, the release of the most recent
Guidelines in April 1995.24 Although differing in content, each set of
guidelines has set forth the Department's enforcement policy and in-
cluded a number of illustrative cases. For example, the 1977 and 1988
Guidelines included technology and know-how licensing, whereas the
1995 Guidelines promulgated by the current administration treat this
area separately.' Moreover, where the 1977 Guide limited itself to
mainly the Sherman Act, the 1988 and 1995 Guidelines have incorpo-
rated a bevy of antitrust and trade-related legislation, including: Na-
tional Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993,26 Export
Trading Company Act of 1982,27 Wilson Tariff Act,28 Trade Act of
20 Stephen J. Squeri, Government Investigation and Enforcement: Antitrust Division, 847
PLI/Corp. 11, 16 (June-July 1994). The Department of Justice shares enforcement power of The
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1990) with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
21 In 1955, the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee was among the earliest organiza-
tions to publicly discuss Justice Department enforcement policy. 1 WILaUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.1, at 44 (3d. ed. 1982).
22 United States Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations, reprinted in Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 799 (Feb. 1, 1977) [hereinaf-
ter 1977 Guide].
23 United States Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations, reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988) [here-
inafter 1988 Guidelines].
24 1995 Guidelines, supra note 5.
25 See supra note 4.
26 15 U.S.C. § 4301-06 (1994)(amended 1993)(specifying that certain forms of research-ori-
ented business combinations receive rule of reason treatment under U.S. antitrust law).
27 15 U.S.C. § 4001-4053 (1994) (promoting U.S. exports by, among other things, modifying
the application of the antitrust laws to certain export trade).
28 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1994) (prohibiting restraints of trade when made between two or more per-
sons involving imports into the U.S.).
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1974,29 among others. The 1995 Guidelines thus represent the third
major pronouncement on U.S. extraterritorial antitrust enforcement
in the space of twenty years.
Enforcement guidelines have been considered an appropriate
mode for expression of U.S. antitrust policy both because antitrust
laws do not lend themselves well to mechanical application, and be-
cause antitrust enforcement policy is "a form of industrial policy" and
therefore, like any economic policy, is open to judgment based on re-
sults.30 The benchmark against which the international antitrust en-
forcement policies of the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton
administrations have been judged has been the U.S. merchandise
trade deficit. Reducing the trade deficit has been an explicit goal
since the publication of the 1977 Guide.31 Judged in this light, actual
results have been disappointing. In 1977, the burgeoning U.S. mer-
chandise trade deficit stood at $26 billion. Eleven years later, in 1988,
the deficit had ballooned to $123 billion. By 1993, policymakers were
nearly apoplectic as the deficit continued its growth to reach a stagger-
ing $131 billion.32 That U.S. exports have also risen steadily since
1977-U.S. merchandise exports stood at $119 billion in 1977, but had
grown to $322 billion in 1988 and $461 billion in 199333 -has been
seen as a success, of sorts, but one that has been dwarfed by the tow-
ering merchandise trade deficit. Thus, each successive international
enforcement guideline, and the successive presidential administrations
that have implemented the guidelines, has had to contend with the
relentless growth in the U.S.'s merchandise trade deficit.
II (B) JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND VIEWS
ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE
1977 GUIDE
The 1977 Guide began with a fairly non-controversial premise.
Extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws should "protect the
American consuming public" and, more importantly, "protect the
29 19 U.S.C. § 2101-495 (1994)(promoting international trade and establishing punitive trade
measures when U.S. exporters are confronted by overseas trade barriers).
30 Joel Davidow, U.S. InternationalAntitrust Enforcement: Goals and Guidelines, 1988 FoRD-
HAM CoRp. L. INST. 2-1, 2-5.
31 Douglas E. Rosenthal, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division, De-
partment of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Policy of the Department of Justice in International
Trade, 1979 FoRDrHAM Conp. L. IN ST. 301, 302.
32 Survey of Current Business Statistics, United States Department of Commerce, Economic
and Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
33 Id.
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U.S. domestic market against restraints on competition - restraints
on entry, pricing and terms of sales."'34 The subtext of the 1977 Guide
was somewhat more complex. At the time, the U.S. business commu-
nity saw itself as the long-suffering victim of over-zealous antitrust en-
forcement and was convinced that Justice Department antitrust
enforcement was having a deleterious effect on U.S. exports.35 Less,
not more, enforcement appeared to be the path to greater prosperity.
The Justice Department hoped that the 1977 Guide's opening state-
ment of intent would mollify the concerns of the U.S. export commu-
nity and provide evidence that the U.S. was now "following more
enlightened policies."36 Later, when the administrative efforts were
deemed to have failed, Congress made a legislative effort to address
U.S. industry's concern by passing the Foreign Trade and Antitrust
Improvement Act (FTAIA) 37 in 1982.
The 1977 Guide's stance on subject matter jurisdiction was based
upon a bewildering array of "effects" tests that were then enjoying
varying degrees of popularity among the circuit courts. On its face, at
least, the 1977 Guide's test for when U.S. jurisdiction justifiably could
be asserted foreshadowed the FTAIA formulation: "the U.S. antitrust
laws should be applied to an overseas transaction when there is a sub-
stantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. '38  By "foresee-
able," the 1977 Guide meant that the conduct's "clear purpose" was
"to restrain significant commerce in the U.S.," 3 9 language which
seems to be a nod in the direction of specific intent, or at least a gen-
eral intent to harm U.S. exporters. As for the meaning of "substan-
tial," in the context of export foreclosure, there was "no argument
about the affirmative assertion of U.S. jurisdiction" when overseas
conduct lead to foreclosure of U.S. exports.'
Thus, in order to assert U.S. jurisdiction, the Department was
not required to find direct spillover effects in the U.S. domestic econ-
omy such as price movements or supply disruptions. In the view of
one Department official, a commendable example of U.S. subject
matter jurisdiction deployment was the Justice Department's offensive
34 1977 Guide, supra note 22, at E-2.
35 George E. Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1, 4 (1982).
36 Davidow, supra note 30, at 2-7.
37 See supra note 17.
38 1977 Guide, supra note 22, at E-2, E-3 (emphasis added).
39 1977 Guide, supra note 22, at E-3.
40 Douglas E. Rosenthal, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in U.S. Export Trade, 1977 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROC. OF THE 71ST ANN. MEETING 214, 214.
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in the late 1950s against General Electric and a group of U.S. manu-
facturers with operations in Canada. The alleged antitrust offense was
that the U.S. manufacturers had refused to issue technology licenses
to competing U.S. manufacturers who sought to export American-
made radios to Canada rather than establish a Canadian manufactur-
ing plant. Like U.S. v. Pilkington plc., the General Electric court ap-
proved a consent decree without reaching the merits of the case. It
was the Department's view that the court justifiably exercised jurisdic-
tion because the licensing arrangement "foreclosed U.S. export
competition."'"
Yet, the outwardly aggressive stance of the 1977 Guide towards
Sherman Act jurisdiction was moderated by its respect of principles of
international comity. In contrast to its successor policy guides, the
1977 Guide incorporated international comity as an affirmative de-
fense to the exertion of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction.4' Interna-
tional comity is the extent to which U.S. courts accord deference and
respect to the legislative, executive or judicial acts and policies of
other nations when those acts have a knock-on effect within the U.S.43
Taking its cue from the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law, the 1977 Guide supported the jurisdictional rule of reason enun-
ciated in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America:44 conflicts be-
tween the laws of two countries should be decided according to which
41 Id. at 218. The cases known collectively as the Radio Patents Pool cases were settled in a
series of consent decrees in 1962 and were heavily protested by the Canadian government even
though no Canadian companies were named as defendants. See U. S. v. General Electric Com-
pany, 1962-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,342 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); U. S. v. General Electric Company,
1962-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); U. S. v. General Electric Company, 1962-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,546 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
42 1977 Guide, supra note 22, at E-3.
43 Baxter, supra note 14, at 17. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "[i]n general, principle
of 'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions
of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual
respect." Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc. 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), in BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). International comity considerations are invoked when adherence to
U.S. law affects non-U.S. nationals. Based on an eight factor analysis, U.S. courts may find the
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction to be "unreasonable" when compliance with U.S. impinges on an-
other nation's sovereignty. Restatement of the Law (Third) The Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 403 cmt. a (1986) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)].
44 549 F.2d 597,615 (9th Cir. 1976), affd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1032 (1985) (developing a tripartite balancing test which considered (a) whether the conduct was
intended to or did effect the foreign commerce of the U.S. (b) whether the conduct was of a
magnitude so as to be a cognizable violation of the Sherman Act, and (c) whether, as a matter of
international comity, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. should be asserted). The Third,
Fifth, Tenth, and Ninth Circuits had adopted the 71mberlane test prior to passage of the FTAIA.
Griffin, supra note 10, at 7.
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nation has "the more important national interest at stake. . . ."I An-
other moderating influence was the Guide's stance that an overseas
wrongdoer's conduct must have a relatively substantial impact on do-
mestic U.S. commerce before U.S. courts could justifiably get in-
volved. For example, in "Case L" which deals with an offshore price
cartel run by a government-owned mining corporation, subject matter
jurisdiction is premised on the fact that the foreign-owned defendant
controls seventy-five percent of the U.S. market for the commodity
subject to the price-fixing arrangement. 46 Even in a case where there
is a large domestic impact, the comment to "Case L" indicates that
principles of international comity would trump U.S. jurisdiction, limit-
ing the willingness of the Justice Department to prosecute the foreign
wrongdoer.47
II(c) JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND
VIEWS ON SUBJECT MATTR JURISDICrION UNDER THE
1988 GUIDELINES
The Republican presidential victory in 1980 brought with it "Chi-
cago School" thinking on economic policy, and the Antitrust Divi-
sion's enforcement policy reflected this change from day one. 8 What
"Chicago School" thinking meant in real-world terms was the intro-
duction of "about as minimal an antitrust program as can be
imagined."49 In comparison to the 1977 Guide and Carter-era en-
45 1977 Guide, supra note 22, at E-14. Nevertheless, the 1977 Guide takes a fairly stem tone
in the illustrative cases which it reviews. For example, in Case K, a foreign government orders
independent U.S. companies operating in that country to take action which is contrary to U.S.
antitrust law and which has domestic effects. Because the defendant is a U.S. corporation, how-
ever, international comity does not protect the defendant from suit within the U.S. 1977 Guide,
supra note 22, at E-14.
46 1977 Guide, supra note 22, at E-15.
47 1977 Guide, supra note 22, at E-15.
48 At the heart of the Chicago School model of antitrust policy is the belief that the sole
raison d'etre of U.S. antitrust policy should be enhancement of allocative efficiency in the mar-
ketplace. Thus, its proponents advocate dispensing with a number of concepts which heretofore
were staples of the antitrust lexicon: tie-ins which result when a seller requires a buyer to
purchase a second product as a condition to purchasing the first; resale price maintenance agree-
ments, which under Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(a.k.a., "Dr. Miles rule") are accorded per se treatment; and, the doctrine of predatory pricing.
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). In
Posner's words, "the focus of the antitrust laws should not be on unilateral action; it should
instead be on: (1) cartels and (2) horizontal mergers large enough to create monopoly directly, as
in the classic trust cases, or to facilitate cartelization by drastically reducing the number of signif-
icant sellers in the market." Id. at 928.
49 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy in a Clinton Administration, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 217, 217
(1993).
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forcement, the Department of Justice policy became far less intrusive
towards foreign conduct with possible U.S. antitrust implications. The
1988 Guidelines-the culmination of eight years of policy evolution-
took the admonition of Robert Bork to heart; namely, the sole value
underlying U.S. antitrust law should be consumer welfare.50 The shift
in emphasis reflected the 1988 Guideline framers' belief that the real
intent of the Sherman Act was the protection of consumers and that
Department action should be measured by improvements to long-run
consumer welfare.5' More tellingly, in Footnote 159 of the 1988
Guidelines, the Department expressly foreswore extension of U.S. ju-
risdiction where U.S. consumers were not directly harmed.52 Not sur-
prisingly, extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws was
minimal throughout the Reagan era.
The 1988 Guidelines outdid its 1977 predecessor in moderating
the extraterritorial extension of The Sherman Act by softening its ju-
risdictional requirements. That the Reagan administration Justice De-
partment had overseen passage of the FTAIA meant that the 1988
Guidelines' drafters were inclined to follow its "direct, substantial and
foreseeable" formulation to the letter. Footnote 159 described the
substantiality and directness requirements in terms of "adverse ef-
fects on competition that would harm U.S. consumers by reducing
output or raising prices."'53 Moreover, a logical corollary of Footnote
159 was that foreclosure of U.S. export commerce did not invoke U.S.
jurisdiction except where the exclusion of a U.S. exporter from a for-
eign market was "essential" to the ability of that exporter to compete
in the U.S.54 The 1988 Guidelines also implicitly incorporated
Timberlane's jurisdictional rule of reason: "... in determining whether
it would be reasonable to assert jurisdiction.. .in a given case, the
Department considers whether significant interests of any foreign sov-
ereign would be affected .... ,55 Thus, unlike both its predecessor and
successor policy guides, the 1988 Guidelines clearly required the pres-
50 Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON, 7, 11
(1966).
51 Joel Davidow, Keiretsu and U.S. Antitrust, 24 LAw & PoI'Y INT'L Bus. 1035, 1048 (1993);
At the heart of the 1988 Guidelines' approach to both domestic and international enforcement
policy was the proposition that "only conduct which reduces output in the market as a whole and
thus threatens to injure consumers should violate antitrust laws." Davidow, supra note 30, at 2-,
11.
52 1988 Guidelines, supra note 23, at S-21 n. 159.
53 1988 Guidelines, supra note 23, at S-21 n. 159.
54 Charles T. Rule, U.S. Enforcement Policy and Jurisdiction, 1987 CoRP. L. INsT. N. Am. &
COMMON MKT. ANrrrusT & TRADE LAWS 1, 3.
55 1988 Guidelines, supra note 23, at S-22.
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ence of domestic spillover effects before sanctioning assertion of U.S.
subject matter jurisdiction.
II(D) DEVELOPMENTS IN ENFORCEMENT POLICY DURING THE
BUSH AND CLINTON ADMINISTRATIONS
During the Bush administration, "pragmatism replaced ideologi-
cal rigidity" as the pendulum began to swing back towards meaningful
antitrust enforcement in a whole range of substantive areas that had
been abandoned during the Reagan years.56 In the waning days of the
Bush presidency, with the trade deficit exceeding the boundaries of
political acceptability, the Department abandoned its tolerant attitude
towards extraterritorial conduct that violated U.S. antitrust laws. In
part as a stick-waving gesture in the wake of President Bush's ill-fated
"jobs-trip" to Japan,57 then Attorney General William P. Barr an-
nounced that the Department was dropping Footnote 159, which had
essentially renounced Department of Justice extraterritorial enforce-
ment against foreign defendants where the effects were felt solely by
U.S. exporters, from the 1988 Guidelines.58 The U.S. Department of
Justice was now fully prepared to bring lawsuits against non-U.S. com-
panies whose conduct outside U.S. territory violated U.S. antitrust
laws to the detriment of U.S. exporters.
After the Democratic presidential victory in 1992, Clinton admin-
istration officials quickly made known their intention to vigorously en-
force U.S. antitrust laws on behalf of U.S. exporters. During a U.S.-
Japan Framework negotiation, the Justice Department told the Japa-
nese negotiators that "it is our policy to apply and enforce the law as
the facts warrant," regardless of the nationality of the alleged viola-
tor. 59 More tangible steps were taken to reinvigorate enforcement
policy when the Administration moved to beef-up the 1988 Guidelines
by replacing those sections related to intellectual property and tech-
nology.6" Finally, in October 1994, the Clinton administration
scrapped the 1988 Guidelines altogether and circulated for public
56 Pitofsky, supra note 49, at 218.
57 By his own assessment, President Bush's trip to Japan was "essentially a journey aimed at
creating jobs, jobs, jobs." Ellen Warren, Bush Turns Up Trade Rhetoric, DmRorr FREE PRESS,
Jan. 3, 1992, at 2E. The trip failed to relieve U.S.-Japan trade tensions.
58 United States Department of Justice Policy Regarding Anticompetitive Conduct that Re-
stricts U.S. Exports: Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy (Apr. 3, 1992), reprinted in 62
Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 479 (Apr. 9, 1992).
59 U.S. Officials Urge More Activity by Japanese in Antitrust Enforcement, 65 Antitrust and
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1642, at 717 (Dec. 2, 1993).
60 Proposed U.S. Guidelines Create Intellectual Property "Safety Zone," id., at 1.
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comment a draft of the new international enforcement guidelines.
The 1995 Guidelines' goal was not only the protection of U.S. con-
sumers, but also the enforcement of "our antitrust laws against an-
ticompetitive practices that harm U.S. commerce."1
61
Throughout its history, U.S. international antitrust enforcement
policy has responded to the perceived needs of U.S. exporters rather
than a concern for the U.S. competitive business environment. When,
in the early 1980s, Chicago School antitrust pundits suggested that ex-
cessive enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws retarded exports, the Jus-
tice Department obligingly played dead. In terms of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Justice Department focused its efforts on cases meet-
ing the requirements of the "strict territoriality" doctrine:62 enforce-
ment efforts were targeted at cases involving "significant activities in
the United States, even where some of the conspirators may never
have set foot within the U.S."'63 Moreover, the Justice Department
expressly endorsed a jurisdictional test which gave wide berth to prin-
ciples of international comity.'4 Today, as is evident in U.S. v. Pilk-
ington and the 1995 Guidelines, the Clinton administration's antitrust
gurus subscribe to a new wisdom. Objective territoriality has sup-
planted strict territoriality, and tough international antitrust enforce-
ment is one part of the administration's strategy to reduce the trade
deficit.
I(A) SUBJECr MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT, PRE-FTAIA
The controversy concerning U.S. subject matter jurisdiction over
non-U.S. antitrust laws has its origins in the legislative debate over
passage of the Sherman Act.65 At best, that debate was inconclusive.
61 International Antitrust Guidelines for Public Comment, United States Department of Jus-
tice Press Release, Oct. 13, 1994, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 338, part 2, at 37 (Oct. 18, 1994).
62 John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Anti-
trust Law, Remarks Before the International Law Institute and American Bar Association's In-
ternational Law Section (Dec. 10, 1980), in [1969-83 Transfer Binder] 475 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 50,424, at 55, 959-60 (Feb. 2, 1981). Although the Reagan administration pursued an
enforcement policy based exclusively on "strict territoriality," Shenefield recognized the valid-
ity of "objective territoriality" or the "effects" doctrine which held that U.S. jurisdiction ensued
whenever overseas antitrust violations effected U.S. commerce. Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 55,961. See supra note 44, discussing the 9th Circuit's subject matter requirements
in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) and its relationship
to comity.
65 15 U.S.C §§ I and 2 (1990) (declaring illegal restraints of trade, "among the several States,
or with foreign nations,. . ."). Inclusion of international trade was hotly debated during the
legislative debates. For example, in an amendment to the final draft over whether the Sherman
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One scholar has observed that, with respect to overseas application of
the Sherman Act, the trust-busting Congress had two goals in mind:
first, the drafters had a keen appreciation of the relationship between
imports and domestic effects on competition, and second, the framers
wished to prevent "jurisdiction hopping" by U.S. companies whose
Sherman Act violations may have been perpetuated extraterritori-
ally.66 There was no mention in the legislative record that U.S. anti-
trust laws could or should somehow be used to maintain the
competitive integrity of foreign markets on behalf of U.S. exporters.67
However, the ambiguity of the legislative record has not stopped
the Supreme Court from consistently including extraterritorial con-
duct within the Sherman Act's jurisdictional reach.68 In fact, pinning
down the exact location of those jurisdictional boundaries has been
the subject of an ongoing debate that has engaged some of the coun-
try's greatest jurists but yielded little common agreement.69 Indeed,
ever since Judge Learned Hand announced the "effects test" for exer-
tion of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct in
Alcoa, the federal circuits have been badly splintered, disagreeing
over the type of conduct and the degree of domestic effects required
to find a non-U.S. entity liable under the Sherman Act.7"
Act should encompass "commerce .... with foreign nations," there was considerable skepticism
over the extent to which the federal government had the power to regulate foreign commerce
not directly related to the "importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into the
United States." A number of the debate-participants stated their belief that U.S. antitrust juris-
diction could extend no further than the federal government's regulatory power over interstate
commerce. 21 Cong. Rec. 598 - 99 (daily ed. March 25, 1890)(statement of Senator George).
66 1 JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINOMAN BREWSTER, ANTrrRusT AND AMERICAN BusINEss
ABROAD § 2.03, 25 (2d ed. 1981).
67 ld. ; Indeed, Robert Bork has written that "the wide variety of other policy goals that have
since been attributed to the framers of the Sherman Act is not to be found in the legislative
history." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrrmusT PARADOX: A PoLIcY AT WAR wrrH ITsELF 21
(1978).
68 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp, 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962).
69 Justice Holmes was among the earliest to address the issue. Writing for the majority in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), Holmes made clear his belief
that U.S. courts should strictly adhere to territorial limitations on the enforcement of the Sher-
man Act. See 1 HAWK, supra note 19, at 63 n. 3 (1991 Supp.). Some forty years later, however,
Judge Learned Hand, sitting in the stead of the Supreme Court which at the time lacked a
quorum, held in United States v. Aluminum Company of America, Inc. that (a) where general
intent can be demonstrated to affect U.S. exports or imports, and (b) such effects can be shown,
then a non-U.S. corporation could be held liable for U.S. antitrust violations. 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2d Cir. 1945). But, lacking specific intent, Judge Hand was emphatic that "Congress did not
intend the Act" to cover extraterritorial violations of U.S. antitrust laws. Id.
70 Edward L. Rholl, Inconsistent Application of the Extraterritorial Provisions of the Sherman
Act: A Judicial Response Based Upon the Much Maligned 'Effects' Test, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 435,
456 (1990).
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Another broad area of general confusion prior to the FTAIA was
the question of international comity and its relationship to subject
matter jurisdiction. In antitrust law, as with other substantive areas of
commercial regulatory law, there was-and some would argue contin-
ues to be-no judicial or legislative agreement on how to reconcile
the fact that in an interdependent global economy the legitimate regu-
latory activities of our foreign trading partners are bound to have sub-
stantial effects on U.S. commerce.7' Up until 1982, Timberlane's
tripartite "jurisdictional rule of reason" test, which balanced the mag-
nitude and foreseeability of harm to U.S. commerce against concerns
of international comity and fairness, still enjoyed wide circulation.72
Yet, there was confusion as to whether the comity leg of the factor
analysis trumped Timberlane's other two factors-intent and magni-
tude of harm-or whether all three factors should be given equal
weight. Given this level of uncertainty in an area fraught with non-
judicial policy considerations, it was wholly anticipated that Congress
would enter the fray and make "explicit" the Sherman Act's applica-
tion to overseas conduct.73 The FTAIA was the result.
III(B) SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE FTAIA
In 1982, Congress undertook to legislate a uniform "effects test"
by amending the Sherman Act so that export commerce with foreign
nations would only be subject to U.S. antitrust laws where there was
"a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce. 74
FTAIA seemed to jettison considerations of comity. Although the
FTAIA's stated intent was "neither to prevent nor to encourage addi-
tional judicial recognition of the special international characteristics of
transactions," 75 the House Report did single out an effects test laid
down by the Second Circuit in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank
71 The Reagan Administration policy was to follow procedures laid down by the OECD
which provided for "notification, exchange of information and consultation between OECD
member countries whenever important interests of one member country are affected by an anti-
trust investigation or proceeding of another member country." Baxter, supra note 14, at 16-17.
72 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
73 H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1982).
74 FTAIA, supra note 17. The FTAIA did "not affect the legal standards for determining
whether conduct violates the antitrust laws, and thus the substantial antitrust issues on the merits
of a claim.... Rather, the FTAIA addresses only the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust
law ...." H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra note 73, at 13.
75 H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra note 73, at 13. (emphasis added). At the time, the Reagan
Administration's top antitrust lawyer, Assistant Attorney General William Baxter, set forth a
number of reasons for separating the effects test from considerations of international comity:
comity involves subjective considerations, whereas the effects test is meant to be objective, and
comity considerations are more properly within the purview of the executive branch.
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Card Association that dispensed with the comity-leg of the Timberlane
test.76 That is, while the court in National Bank of Canada did not
question outright the "pertinence" of international comity, its analysis
of Sherman Act jurisdiction set aside the issue of possible conflicts
between a foreign nation's right to regulate commerce and the effect
that regulation may have on U.S. markets.
Little else pertaining to what constitutes "direct, substantial and
foreseeable" effects is as clear. As for whether harm solely to U.S.
exporters is sufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction, the legisla-
tive history provides little illumination and is, in fact, downright con-
tradictory. On the one hand, the Judiciary Committee Report quotes
Chairman Rodino as saying that "restraints on export trade will only
violate the Sherman Act if they have a direct and substantial effect on
commerce within the United States or a domestic firm competing for
foreign trade."77 The use of the conjunctive "or" would indicate that
harm to U.S. export commerce alone provides a sufficient nexus to
U.S. commerce for jurisdiction to ensue. Yet, two pages later, the Re-
port states that, "absent a spillover effect on the domestic market-
place," illegal conduct directed "solely to exported products.. .would
normally not have the requisite effects on domestic or import
commerce."
78
What can be safely deduced is that the FTAIA's drafters had two
goals in mind: first, counter the extant perception in the U.S. business
community that U.S. antitrust laws are a detriment to export activities,
and second, clarify the different circuit tests for determining whether
United States antitrust jurisdiction over international transactions ex-
ists. 79 While the drafters shared the perennial goal of all antitrust
policymakers to boost exports, their basic views reflected the domi-
nant mood of the Reagan years; as far as government regulation was
concerned, less was more. Reduced antitrust enforcement would
boost exports.8 ° Specifically, the drafters believed that the FTAIA
would make U.S. exporters more internationally competitive by al-
lowing them to enter into "arrangements.. .that may involve the allo-
cation of territorial responsibilities or the establishment of common
prices or other terms of trade, [or] technology licenses that restrict
sales by the contracting parties to particular countries or re-
76 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981).
77 See H.R. Rep. 686, supra note 73, at 7-8.
78 See H. R. Rep. 686, supra note 73, at 10.
79 H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra note 73, at 2.
80 Harold R. Schmidt, The Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 5 J.L. &
COM. 321, 344-345 (1985).
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gions .... ,,81 The belief that U.S. exporters should band together to
conquer the Japanese et al. was further reflected in the first three titles
of the Export Trading Act of 1982 which allowed the Department of
Commerce to register and immunize from antitrust prosecution vari-
ous types of export associations and limit damages in private antitrust
suits.
82
Congress's choice as a guide to what it meant by a "direct, sub-
stantial and reasonably foreseeable" effect is contained in National
Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n.,8 3 a case exhibiting a rela-
tively moderate view of when subject matter jurisdiction should be
exerted. Indeed, the National Bank of Canada court rejected the first
two legs of the Timberlane test-intent and cognizable injury to the
plaintiff-because it feared that the first two tests "may lead unwar-
rantedly to an assertion of jurisdiction whenever the challenged con-
duct is shown to have some effect on American foreign commerce,
even though the actionable aspect of the restraint, the anticompetitive
effect, is felt only within the foreign market in which the injured plain-
tiff seeks to compete." 84 Thus, National Bank of Canada stands for
the proposition that jurisdiction-conferring effects are to be found
only "where the challenged restraint has, or is intended to have any
anticompetitive effect upon United States commerce, either commerce
within the United States or export commerce from the United
States."85 Although the National Bank of Canada formulation ap-
pears to indicate that foreclosure of export commerce alone triggers
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit decision in that particular case leads
one to suspect that foreclosure plus specific intent to harm U.S. export
commerce is required. The court found no effects, and hence no ju-
risdiction, where a Canadian licenser of the Mastercard trademark in-
cluded exclusivity and non-assignability provisions in a licensing
agreement that effectively excluded a U.S. bank from the Canadian
credit card market. Somewhat novelly, the court based its holding on
the fact that the Canadian bank could not have "foreseen" that its
restrictive licensing contract would have "any appreciable anticompe-
titive effects on United States commerce. ' 86 Foreseeability would
81 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 108
(1981)(statement of Martin F. Connor).
82 See supra note 17.
83 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981); H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra note 73, at 11.
84 National Bank of Canada, 666 F.2d at 8.
85 Id. (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 9.
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have been met had the defendant known that its action would have
lead to increased credit card fees for merchants in the United States.
Although the defendant's action may have increased merchant fees
within Canada, "decreased profitability of Canadian merchants is not
a proper concern of the United States. .. ,7 Finally, the court re-
emphasized the well-known antitrust aphorism: "the antitrust laws
were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors.
88
In the FTAIA's own words, "reasonably foreseeable" means an
objective standard for determining intent, "not whether actual knowl-
edge or intent can be shown."8 9 That is, a foreign defendant's intent
to affect U.S. export commerce must be inferable from surrounding
circumstances and "may be satisfied by the rule that a person intends
the natural consequences of his actions."90 An objective standard of
intent also finds support in Alcoa; a defendant must have foreseen
that the challenged conduct would have an effect on U.S. export com-
merce.91 Applied to possible antitrust violations arising from extrater-
ritorial licensing arrangements such as the ones at issue in U.S. v.
Pilkington plc., objective foreseeability would suggest that where a li-
censing agreement incorporates territorial restraints,' subject matter
jurisdiction could not be asserted unless the agreement specifically
named the United States and thus demonstrated the requisite intent
to affect U.S. commerce.93
An effects test that sticks strictly to "intent" avoids being per-
ceived as an effort by the U.S. Justice Department to protect competi-
tors rather than competition. In fact, by asserting subject matter
jurisdiction only when significant effects were intended within the
U.S., the effects test is not really extraterritorial enforcement at all; it
is only the recognition that not all "causative factors" producing an-
87 Id.
88 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977), in Id. at 8.
89 H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra note 73, at 9.
90 FUGATE, supra note 21, at § 2.11.
91 Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Griffin, Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce under the Sher-
man Act, 28 BOSTON COLLt IND. & COMM. L.R. 199, 212 (1977).
92 Territorial restraints are restrictions on where a licensee of technology may use, sell or
claim rights to licensed technology. Although not inherently illegal, Brownell v. Ketchum Wire
& Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1954), territorial restrictions violate U.S. antitrust law
where the licensing agreement impedes the licensee from competing freely against the licenser
using alternative technology or the licensee's own technology which it independently developed.
A.B.A. Antitrust Sec., Monograph No. 6, U.S. Antitrust Law in International Patent and Know-
How Licensing 21 (1981).
93 James A. Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of The American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTe-
TRUST L.J. 521, 526 (1974).
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ticompetitive results will necessarily occur within the U.S. 94 Thus, in a
post-FrAIA case, Laker Airways Limited v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, Judge Starr asserted U.S. jurisdiction over a non-U.S. airline
company whose predatory pricing of fares and interference with the
refinancing attempts of the plaintiff "were designed specifically to
drive Laker out of business and eventually to raise the fares paid by
trans-Atlantic passengers, the bulk of whom are American."95 Be-
cause the trans-Atlantic passenger airline market had a relatively
small number of competitors, it was foreseeable that the elimination
of Laker would lead to higher fares for U.S. passengers. The result in
Laker is consistent with National Bank of Canada in terms of its treat-
ment of foreseeability and, with the Supreme Court's view that
"American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions
of other nations' economies." 96
Although a would be foreign defendant's conduct may meet the
objective foreseeability leg of the FTAIA effects test, an agreement
intended to affect imports or exports is not covered by the Sherman
Act unless there is some actual effect.97 While the FTAIA stipulates
that the effect must be "direct" and "substantial," neither the amend-
ment itself nor the case law suggests a consistent meaning.9" National
Bank of Canada makes clear that jurisdiction is "unwarranted" when
the anticompetitive effect is felt "only within the foreign market in
which the injured plaintiff seeks relief."99 The Second Circuit re-
quired more than damage to the earnings prospects of a single U.S.
credit card company before would assert subject matter jurisdiction
based on "direct and substantial" domestic effects. Several courts,
facing similar jurisdictional issues, have followed National Bank of
Canada's example. These opinions suggest that subject matter juris-
diction requires a connection between the objectionable conduct and
an identifiable market within the U.S. where anticompetitive effects
can be demonstrated. 100 Thus, in Eurim-Pharm Gmgh v. Pfizer Inc.,
the plaintiff's inability to establish a connection between a manufac-
turer's offshore market allocation scheme and inflated prices within
94 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
95 Id. at 925 (emphasis added).
96 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986).
97 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 18, at 444.
98 Lao, supra note 3, at 856.
99 666 F.2d. at 8.
100 ld. at 8-9; Power East Ltd. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 558 F. Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), affd. 742 F.2d 1439 (2d. Cir. 1983) (failure to demonstrate a nexus with American trade or
"relevant market" within the U.S. warranted dismissal for inadequate subject matter
jurisdiction).
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the United States for the drug Vibramycin was fatal under the "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable" test.1 1
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions have been even more strict
in applying the effects test, reasoning that extraterritorial conduct
"must cause actual injury to domestic commerce." 2 Extending juris-
diction on the basis of "intended or actual effect on United States
foreign trade" was "unwarranted."'01 3 Where a U.S. travel agent lost
business as a result of a foreign hotel operator's refusal to accept the
plaintiff's tour booking, there was no jurisdiction because the extrater-
ritorial conduct did not "have any direct, substantial or reasonably
foreseeable effect on competition among United States tour opera-
tors."'1° As applied to the question of substantial and direct effects in
U.S. v. Pilkington, plc., more than lost export opportunities for certain
U.S. glass manufacturers would be required to meet the Second Cir-
cuit's rigorous jurisdictional test. What the Department would be re-
quired to demonstrate is that Pilkington's conduct resulted in some
anticompetitive effect in the U.S. flat glass manufacturing industry or
float glass plant construction industry through a direct spillover such
as increased prices, reduced supply or increased cost to market
participants
A tough standard for direct and substantial effects is consistent
with the stated preference of the majority of commentators who testi-
fied at the legislative hearings associated with the enactment of the
FTAIA. Their concerns were severalfold. First, they wanted to free
U.S. exporters from the restraining shackles of U.S. antitrust laws so
long as the exporters conduct had "no direct and substantial effect on
domestic commerce.' 1 5 Second, they wished to prevent private ac-
tions against U.S. exporters where the primary effect of the alleged
antitrust conduct was "on a foreign company in a foreign country."'0 6
One observer closely involved with the drafting of the FTAIA re-
ported that it was the drafters' intent to legislate out of existence "ab-
errational" cases in which U.S. courts had asserted jurisdiction based
on effects to foreign markets and where the consequences for U.S.
101 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 -7, (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
102 Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920,923 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)(empha-
sis added).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 925.
105 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm
on the Judiciary, supra note 81, at 72 (statement of John H. Shennenfield)(emphasis added).
106 Id. at 38 (statement of David Goldsweig).
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corporations had been ancillary. 10 7 For example, the FTAIA pre-
cluded subject matter jurisdiction based on the "nexus" test employed
in Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc. by the D.C.
Circuit. 08 In that instance, Judge Leventhal asserted U.S. jurisdiction
over an alleged conspiracy by American-flag shipping services to ex-
clude certain rivals who were shipping commodity products between
Taiwan and South Vietnam. Even though the trade was wholly uncon-
nected to U.S. commerce, the court determined that there was a
"nexus" between the overseas shipping activities of the defendants
and the U.S. by virtue of the fact that the commodities in question
were financed by the State Department's AID program, which stipu-
lated that participants in the shipping program had to be American.109
If an extraterritorial shipping program financed by the U.S. govern-
ment whose participants were American-flag shipping companies was
deemed to be outside the jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws by the
FTAIA's drafters, because of insufficient domestic effects, it seems
difficult to believe that those same drafters intended the "direct, sub-
stantial and reasonably foreseeable" test to apply to a non-American
corporation whose licensing agreements only affected overseas
markets.
As the post-FTAIA case law indicates, there is no clear test for
determining what degree of effects on U.S. exporters is sufficient to
trigger U.S. jurisdiction in instances where the defendant lacks specific
intent to foreclose exports. As discussed, courts have recognized the
effects from foreclosure of U.S. exports in two ways: (1) spillover into
the U.S. domestic market that affects prices, supply, cost or other mar-
ket factors, and (2) harm to U.S. export opportunities." 0 The legisla-
tive history of the FTAIA, while ambiguous on the issue of whether
export foreclosure alone triggers Sherman Act jurisdiction, advocates
an overall relaxation of U.S. jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct
in order to avoid making U.S. courts the antitrust watchdogs of for-
eign markets. And the case law recommended by the drafters of the
FTAIA demonstrates that where the harm is to competitors and not
the competitive market, subject matter jurisdiction does not ensue.
Where export foreclosure is concerned, the determination of whether
107 Joseph P. Griffin, Comparison of the Export Trading Company Act and the Foreign Anti-
trust Improvements Act, in EXPORT TRADING Acr OF 1982, 17 (Joseph P. Griffin, ed. 1982).
108 404 F.2d. 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Griffin also cites Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Guld &
Western Ind., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), as an example of aberrational assertion of
U.S. subject matter jurisdiction. Griffin, Comparison, supra note 106, at 19.
109 404 F.2d at 816-7.
110 1 HAWK, supra note 19, at 167 (1993 Supp.).
305
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 16:284 (1995)
that foreclosure is "direct and substantial" should turn on the amount
of export commerce foreclosed in light of the importance of exports to
that industry and the share of the export market foreclosed by the
challenged arrangement.'1 ' In gauging the "direct and substantial" ef-
fects upon export foreclosure, however, courts should be mindful of
the Sherman Act's raison d'etre; namely, that "consumer welfare [was]
to be the decisive value" governing antitrust policy, not the welfare of
specific exporters or export sectors. 1 2 Therefore, unless there are di-
rect and substantial effects to U.S. domestic markets, the standard by
which "direct and substantial" effects are judged should exclude cases
where export trade boosters, whether in the Justice Department or the
private sector, seek to use U.S. antitrust jurisdiction as an export
weapon.
113
IV(A) THE 1995 GUIDELINES AND US. v. PILKNGTON PLC.:
EXERTION OF SUBJECT MAT=ER JURISDICTION
The 1995 Guidelines' view of subject matter jurisdiction is far
more aggressive than any of its predecessors. In keeping with the
FTAIA, the 1995 Guidelines divide jurisdictional issues into three cat-
egories: (1) direct imports into the United States; (2) indirect imports
into the United States where, for example, the antitrust violation is
perpetrated by a producer whose products are sold in the U.S.
through a third-party intermediary; and (3) export cases where a vio-
lation of U.S. antitrust laws-whether perpetrated within the U.S. or
overseas either by U.S. or foreign persons-restrains U.S. exports.
Because the FTAIA does not cover import commerce,"' jurisdic-
tional issues involving direct imports are covered by the generic "ef-
fects test" as first revealed in Alcoa and universally followed ever
since, most recently in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California."'
That antitrust subject matter jurisdiction can be easily invoked
where export commerce is concerned is one of the 1995 Guidelines'
most salient features. Its standard for determining jurisdictional ques-
111 Id. at 171; other factors suggested by Hawk include business justification and duration of
foreclosure.
112 BoRx, supra note 50, at 11.
113 See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 66, § 9.28, at 305 (discussing need for greater leni-
ency when prosecuting exclusive dealing and tying contracts as well as when defining foreign
markets for determination of the extent to which export opportunities have been foreclosed).
114 The FTAIA leaves the Sherman Act unchanged with respect to U.S.-bound imports and
commercial transactions "within, between, and among other nations" that are neither import nor
export transactions, even if American-owned companies are involved. H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra
note 73, at 9.
115 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993).
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tions emphasizes the degree to which the conduct of an overseas de-
fendant forecloses U.S. exports, regardless of whether that reduction
has had an impact on U.S. domestic markets. Illustrative Example D
is typical. Where foreign producers of "product Q" in "country Epsi-
Ion" collude to prevent a U.S. producer from entering country Epsi-
Ion's markets for product Q, direct and reasonably foreseeable effects
on U.S. export commerce trigger U.S. subject matter jurisdiction so
long as the export volumes in question are more than de minimis."
6
Illustrative Example E is similarly unambiguous in declaring that ex-
port foreclosure alone triggers U.S. subject matter jurisdiction. In this
example, the 1995 Guidelines set forth a scenario in which a foreign
country's trade association colludes to (1) refuse to adopt any U.S.
technology for the goods in question, and (2) boycott the distribution
of U.S.-manufactured goods within the foreign country. As in Exam-
ple D, unless U.S. export volume is de minimis, the 1995 Guidelines
indicate that the FTAIA's substantiality and directness requirements
would be met: "The mere fact that only the market of Alpha [the ficti-
tious country's name] appears to be foreclosed is not enough to defeat
such an effect."" 7 The text accompanying this example fails, how-
ever, to comment on whether any findings of domestic spillover ef-
fects need to be found. Even though Illustrative Example E's export
products are large, big-ticket items, it is unclear where the harmful
"effects" to U.S. commerce arise. Is it that foreclosure from Alpha's
markets affect U.S. domestic prices and availability of the goods in
question? Or, is it that an overwhelming share of U.S. production is
destined for export, without which the industry could not survive? Or,
is it that the U.S. claims the right to police all anticompetitive prac-
tices in foreign markets in which U.S. exports are at stake?
Moreover, the standard for determining when extraterritorial
conduct is "foreseeable" is equally expansive. In Illustrative Example
B and its variants, a group of non-U.S. widget manufacturers agree to
restrict trade in certain goods in a number of foreign markets. None
of the manufacturers has any U.S. production or any subsidiaries lo-
cated in the U.S. However, the putative defendants are aware of sales
into the U.S. made through an independent intermediary.118 Despite
what appears to be an intent to avoid jurisdictional contact with the
U.S., the Department contemplates U.S. subject matter jurisdiction as
116 1995 Guidelines, supra note 5, at S-10.
117 1995 Guidelines, supra note 5, at S-10.
118 1995 Guidelines, supra note 5, at S-9.
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if the foreign manufacturers made direct sales into the U.S." 9 Illus-
trative Example B also suggests that where § 1 violations occur-the
foreign manufacturers had an agreement in restraint of trade-fore-
seeability deserves greater weight than directness or substantiality of
effects because the Department's focus would be on "the potential
harm that would ensue if the conspiracy were successful, not on
whether actual conduct.. .had in fact the prohibited effect." 20 Taken
to a logical extreme, non-U.S. oil companies participating in the
OPEC oil price cartel could be caught in the web of U.S. subject mat-
ter jurisdiction if, as a result of the cartel's activity, domestic oil prices
and supplies were affected.
Unlike the 1977 Guide which approached subject matter jurisdic-
tion with a similar ferocity, the 1995 Guidelines' aggressive jurisdic-
tional philosophy is not tempered by considerations of international
comity. The exclusion of comity is understandable, both because the
FTAIA jettisoned comity and, more importantly, because of a 1993
U.S. Supreme Court decision, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, that
held that in cases of import commerce, at least, comity considerations
and subject matter jurisdiction are two separate issues. 21 The Hart-
ford Fire case arose when several state governments brought antitrust
actions against British and American insurance companies based on
an alleged agreement to restrict insurance coverage for certain risks in
the U.S. Unlike U.S. v. Pilkington, there was no dispute as to whether
the defendants' conduct was intended to and did produce a substantial
effect on the U.S. insurance market.'" Writing for a divided court,
Justice Souter set aside the petitioner's international comity claim
stating that there is no conflict with foreign law unless a defendant is
required by law "to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the
United States" or can claim that "compliance with the laws of both
countries would be impossible."'23 In keeping with Justice Souter's
analysis, the 1995 Guidelines state that "no conflict exists for purposes
of an international comity analysis... if the person subject to regula-
tion by two states can comply with the laws of both."'" Essentially,
domestic effects now are considered in a vacuum, without regard to
possible conflicts with a foreign government's regulatory scheme, so
long as compliance with U.S. law does not compel violation of a for-
119 1995 Guidelines, supra note 5, at S-9.
120 1995 Guidelines, supra note 5 (Italics added).
121 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra note 115, at 2910.
122 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra note 115, at 2909 n. 21.
123 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra note 115, at 2910-11.
124 1995 Guidelines, supra note 5, at S-12.
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eign government's law. Nevertheless, many countries regard an "ef-
fects test" that ignores considerations of comity to be a radical
departure from principles of international law.' 25
That the 1995 Guidelines' view of subject matter jurisdiction is
indeed expansive is evident in U.S. v. Pilkington plc. The complaint
decries Pilkington's foreclosure of export opportunities for U.S. com-
panies which construct float glass manufacturing facilities as well as
export float glass exports themselves.1 26 What the Complaint does not
demonstrate is how Pilkington, with a worldwide market share of only
twenty percent, true dominance in only two minor geographic mar-
kets, Argentina and Australia, and technology which is over thirty
years old, can affect the world's supply of float glass or the supply of
float process technology to such an extent that output or price in the
U.S. is detrimentally affected. Extrapolating from the logic of the
complaint, it seems that even without some demonstration of domes-
tic spillover-either reduced supply or increased prices-non-U.S.
participants in any agreement construed to restrain foreign commerce
could be subject to U.S. antitrust regulation if a U.S. exporter's oppor-
tunities are impaired. The danger is that the effects test thereby be-
comes a mechanism for policing the competitive integrity of foreign
markets, precisely the result foresworn by the FTAIA, earlier case law
and the drafters of the Sherman Act.
IV(B) US. V. PfLKINGTOA, PLC: INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
It was perhaps no accident that the Justice Department chose a
flat glass manufacturer for its first major extraterritorial antitrust en-
forcement action under the newly reinvigorated policy. The industry
has been at the center of at least one recent antitrust dispute involving
possible antitrust violations within the territorial U.S. by non-U.S.
125 An effects test limited to acts with direct, tangible repercussions - such as shooting a
firearm across a border - would be more acceptable to those who adhere strictly to principles
of comity under international law. Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws:
Yokosuka and Yokota, and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 821,829 n.32 (1994);
Over the past several decades, foreign governments have signaled their dissatisfaction with U.S.
extraterritorial enforcement of the Sherman Act by passing "blocking statutes" which block the
production of evidence in the home country for use in U.S. lawsuits and "claw-back" statutes
which allow foreign companies, after being judged guilty and assessed with a penalty in the U.S.,
to bring suit to recover the penal portion of that judgment in its own jurisdiction. Aiden Robert-
son & Marie Demetriou, "But that was in another country .... ": The Extraterritorial Application
of U.S. Antitrust Laws in the U.S. Supreme Court, 43 ITr'L & COMP. L.Q. 417,418 (1994). See
also FUGAT, supra note 21, at § 2.16.
126 Complaint, U.S. v. Pilkington plc., No. 94-345 (D. Ariz, May 25, 1994) at 14 (on file with
The Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business).
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manufacturers' 27 and, until recently, was at the center of a major in-
ternational trade controversy with Japan.1  The industry's oligopolis-
tic structure makes it a natural target of antitrust suspicions. The
world's top three producers account for approximately sixty-four per-
cent of annual global sales. 129 Moreover, domestic producers have not
been shy in their efforts to enlist Justice Department support in crack-
ing overseas markets.1
30
Of the $48 billion in annual worldwide glass sales, the flat glass
segment accounts for $16 billion. 13 1 Approximately seventy-five per-
cent of U.S. flat glass production goes towards the construction and
automotive industries with the remainder going towards specialty
products.132 In the U.S., only two of the four major producers of flat
glass are independent, PPG Industries and Guardian Industries. Nip-
pon/Libbey-Owens-Ford (LOF), which is the second largest of the
three U.S. producers, is a two-way joint venture between Pilkington
and Nippon Sheet Glass Co. of Japan, which own eighty percent and
twenty percent, respectively. U.S. production has been weak in recent
years with shipments declining from $2.6 billion in 1987 to an esti-
mated $2.2 billion in 1993.133 The one bright spot for U.S. producers
has been exports, which have risen from $497 million in 1989 to $853
127 In 1990 the FTC approved a consent decree prohibiting NipponlLibbey-Owens-Ford
(LOF) from limiting capacity in the U.S. and restricting U.S. imports. See Prepared Statement of
Kevin J. Arquit, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, before the Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Consumer Subcommittee, July 19, 1990.
128 Flat glass is one of the specific sectors addressed in the "United States-Japan Framework
for a New Economic Partnership" announced in July 1993 by President Clinton and Prime Min-
ister Japan and was the subject of an "Action Plan" announced in January 1992 as part of the
Bush-Miyazawa Tokyo Declaration. Specifically, the U.S. is critical of the exclusive relationship
between Japan's three dominant flat glass manufacturers which control 95% of the market and
their wholesalers. United States Trade Representative, 1994 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers 174 (1994). Japan and the U.S. reached an agreement on December 12,
1994 under which the Japanese Government will compel Japanese glass manufacturers to sell
more imported flat glass and related products. David E. Sanger, U.S. Glass Makers in Tokyo
Accord, N.Y. Trmas, Dec. 13, 1994.
129 Giants in Glass, 143 CERAMIC INDusTRY 53 (Aug. 1994).
130 For example, Guardian Industries, a major U.S. flat glass manufacturer, presented the
Justice Department with evidence of anticompetitive behavior by the Japanese glass manufactur-
ing industry as part of its effort to demonstrate the "exclusionary business practices, including
threats and intimidation," the company experienced in Japan. William Spindle and Catherine
Yang, Commerce Cops, Bus. WK., Dec. 13, 1993, at 70. Guardian Industries' political connec-
tions also played a role in resolution of the flat glass trade dispute with Japan. Guardian's Presi-
dent Ralph Gerson, who the New York Times described as "politically well-connected in
Washington," was able to raise the issue of Japan's flat glass market "high on the agenda of trade
negotiators." U.S. Glass Makers in Tokyo Accord, supra note 128.
131 Giants in Glass, supra note 129, at 53.
132 Flat Glass Trends and Forecasts, GLAss MAGAZInE, Jan. 1993, at 61.
133 Flat Glass Shipments to be up in 1994, GAss INDusTRY 14, 15 (Jan. 1994).
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million in 1993.134 However, because of flat glass' size and weight,
continued growth in exports is likely to be limited. 35 The real action
is in direct investment in overseas plant and equipment including sales
of flat glass manufacturing facilities and related construction services.
A typical flat glass facility, including equipment and construction, re-
quires a $100 to $150 million investment, and over the next fifteen
years between thirty and fifty new facilities are projected to be built,
many in the developing world.136 In 1993 alone, two of the three ma-
jor U.S. producers announced major overseas plant expansions:
Guardian Industries is building two new float glass plants in Gujarat,
India and Tudela, Spain, and PPG Industries is building a new joint
venture float glass plant in Dalian, China.
137
IV(c) PILKINGTON'S WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING PRACrICES
Pilkington achieved a major technological jump on its competi-
tors in the flat glass industry when it developed and patented a float
process for manufacturing flat glass during the late 1950s. 138 By using
the float glass process, molten glass can be bent, curved and cut for
use in automobiles or new building construction, and the process is far
superior to either sheet glass or rolled and polished glass processes.
So superior is the technology that nearly all flat glass sold worldwide
is manufactured using the float process in one form or another. 1
39
Pilkington began to take advantage of its new found competitive ad-
vantage in 1962 by entering into patent and know-how licensing
agreements with all its principal competitors. 14 0 By the time of the
Department's action against Pilkington, over ninety-five percent of
flat glass worldwide was manufactured under its licenses. 141 In the
United States, however, only two out of the three big flat glass makers
are still subject to Pilkington's technology licenses, and one of those,
134 Id. 'The U.S. had a fiat glass export surplus of $318 million in 1993.
135 Frank C. Zanone, The Globalization of Glass: An Act of Survival, 75 GLASS INDUSTRY 26,
27 (April 10, 1994)
136 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Pilkington plc. No. 94-345 (D. Ariz., filed
May 25, 1994) at 5 (on file with The Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business).
137 Giants in Glass, supra note 129, at 54.
138 Complaint, Pilkington plc., supra note 126, at 4.
139 Complaint, Pilkinton plc., supra note 126, at 6.
140 Complaint, ITC v. Pilkington, pl c, No. 93-552 (D. Ariz., Aug. 10, 1993), at 8 (on file with
The Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business).
141 Id. at 7.
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Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., is eighty percent owned by Pilkington
itself.1
42
In its float license agreements Pilkington disclosed all its "float
process" know-how and granted non-exclusive licenses under patents
for specified countries. 43 However, in exchange for the right to use
its patented technology, Pilkington placed a host of restrictions upon
the licensee, including: (1) territorial restrictions permitting the licen-
see to construct and operate float glass plants in a limited number of
countries; (2) use restrictions limiting the use of float glass technology
to flat glass manufacturing only; (3) sublicensing restrictions; and (4)
grant-back provisions which required the licensee to report and grant-
back on an exclusive basis all technological improvements to Pilk-
ington's float glass know-how. 144
IV(D) UNITED STATES V. PLKINGTON PLC: SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION AND ALLEGED ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
That the case against Pilkington plc. involved technology licens-
ing makes no difference to the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
No matter how restrictive, licensing agreements are not violative of
U.S. antitrust laws until "U.S. foreign or domestic commerce is af-
fected. '145 Indeed, the FTAIA's seminal case, National Bank of Can-
ada, involved exclusivity provisions in a trademark licensing
agreement. Whether involving licensing restrictions or not, the key
elements of a well-plead Sherman or Clayton Act complaint against a
non-U.S. corporation for extraterritorial conduct are the assertion of
both personal and subject matter jurisdiction as well as specific allega-
tions of conduct in violation of U.S. antitrust laws." 6 Personal juris-
diction is only problematic where a foreign corporation lacks a U.S.
subsidiary and therefore does not meet the "minimum contacts" re-
142 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 136, at 7, 12 (In 1983, following a lawsuit by
Pilkington, Guardian Industries was released from the majority of its obligations under the li-
censing agreements such that Guardian was able to construct float glass plants outside the terri-
tory in which it had been previously constrained.).
143 In addition, Pilkington promised to convey all patented and unpatented improvements
developed within a defined period. The licenses required lump-sum and continuous royalties
and required that all disputes be resolved by arbitration in London under U.K. law. Competitive
Impact Statement, supra note 136, at 8.
144 Pilkington plc., supra note 1, at 9.
145 ATwoOD & BREWSTER, supra note 66, § 11.06 at 6; see also National Bank of Canada,
supra note 76, at 9 (holding that a restrictive licensing of credit card trademark is not in violation
of U.S. antitrust laws unless it "can be foreseen to have any appreciable anticompetitive effects
on U.S. commerce.").
146 James F. Rill, Competition Policy: A Force for Open Markets, 61 AMrrusT L.J. 637, 649
(1993).
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quirement of International Shoe.147 Because Pilkington Holdings Inc.,
a Delaware corporation that is wholly-owned by Pilkington, was
named as a co-defendant by the government, personal jurisdiction was
not disputed. 48 Assuming that Pilkington's licensing arrangements
did violate the U.S. antitrust laws, the Government's case rested on
demonstrating that Pilkington's conduct met the FTAIA's subject
matter jurisdiction formulation: conduct that had a "direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. export trade.
49
The Justice Department attempted to meet the FTAIA's jurisdic-
tional specifications by alleging that Pilkington deprived U.S. business
and consumers of "the benefits of free and open competition."'150
More pointedly, the Government also alleged effects pertaining to
U.S. exporters involved in the overseas design and construction of
float glass plants and related equipment as well as exporters of flat
glass itself.'5 Turning to the antitrust violations themselves, the De-
partment contended that Pilkington's licensing procedures violated
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The section 1 charge was based
on Pilkington's licensing agreements which were an unreasonable re-
straint of trade because of the existence of territorial restraints, use
restraints, sublicensing restraints, and export restraints and because
Pilkington attempted to enforce these restraints after expiration of the
patents. 52 And, that ninety percent of float glass production world-
wide is subject to Pilkington's licensing agreements demonstrates will-
ful acquisition and maintenance of a monopoly for the design and
construction of float glass plants in violation of the prohibition against
monopolization set forth in section 2.1-3
The consent decree filed simultaneously with the Department's
complaint seeks no monetary damages. Rather, it enjoins Pilkington
from enforcing any of its technology licenses unless it can make a
good faith showing that the specific licensing agreement in question
147 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Even where a foreign corporation
may lack a physical U.S. presence, personal jurisdiction may nonetheless be established where
"the foreign national has embarked upon an enterprise which involves the benefits and protec-
tion of the forum state's laws." Schmidt, supra note 80, at 339.
148 Pilkington plc., supra note 1, at 2.
149 Pilkington plc., supra note 1, at 11 - 14.
150 Pilkington plc., supra note 1, at 14.
151 United States v. Pilkington plc, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45, 094, at 44, 689 (D. Ariz.
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protects a bona fide trade secret under applicable law.154 Also prohib-
ited is any future licensing with U.S. entities unless the same good
faith representation could be made regarding the secrecy of the know-
how.155 Finally, the injunction prohibits Pilkington from enforcing li-
censing agreements even with non-U.S. licensees to the extent that
those licenses have "the effect of prohibiting or limiting the manufac-
ture of Float Glass in North America. 156
Because the Government's action against Pilkington was never
fully litigated, it is difficult to assess the merits of the action. It is
nevertheless proper to question whether the job of the U.S. federal
courts should be to impose U.S. rules of fair competition on an oligo-
polistic, cross-border product or technology market where the chal-
lenged competitive restraints do not immediately affect U.S.
consumers. Several factors discussed in the Industry Overview Sec-
tion indicate that the effect on U.S. consumers is likely to be minimal.
First, flat glass cannot feasibly be exported in large quantity because
of its bulk and, in any event, exports are a small proportion of the $2.2
billion domestic market. 157 Second, Pilkington's licensing restrictions
do not affect flat glass produced in the United States. Thus, in terms
of protecting consumer welfare, the float glass market itself should not
be at issue. The relevant product market at stake is really the one for
construction of flat glass manufacturing facilities. However, with con-
sumption decreasing in the domestic market, construction of new float
glass facilities in the U.S. seems unlikely. Moreover, Guardian and
PPG's recent success in winning overseas construction contracts pro-
vides at least anecdotal evidence that the export market is alive and
competitive.
A subsidiary question is whether the U.S. taxpayer should be re-
quired to bank-roll Justice Department enforcement actions when the
main beneficiaries are a small number of U.S. exporters. While there
is little doubt that an attempt to enforce a U.S. patent after its expira-
tion constitutes patent misuse and a violation of U.S. antitrust laws "as
an assertion of monopoly power," it seems unlikely that, without the
requisite effects upon U.S. commerce, patent misuse alone would jus-
tify extension of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction. 58 And as one com-
154 United States v. Pilkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,842, at 73,669-70 (D. Ariz.
1994).
155 Id. at 73,669.
156 Id. at 73,670.
157 See supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
158 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). Patent misuse has been defined as an attempt
"without the sanction of law, to employ the patent to secure a limited monopoly of unpatented
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mentator has noted, use of the consent decree raises the suspicion, at
least, that the settlement enabled the government to avoid a trouble-
some case while allowing it to use the label of 'competition' to "divert
the free market in a desired direction."' 59 Regardless of whether Pilk-
ington's licensing agreements actually violated U.S. antitrust law, the
Justice Department's willingness to bring suit raises serious questions
about the extent to which the U.S. should prosecute non-U.S. compa-
nies for antitrust violations occurring outside the territorial United
States.
V. CONCLUSION
The case against Pilkington reveals an antitrust enforcement pol-
icy built on an aggressive strategic trade policy1 60 rather than a careful
approach to antitrust jurisprudence. While it is expected that trade
policy will fluctuate with changing political winds, antitrust law falls
into the realm of public regulatory law and therefore must be "compli-
able.' 161 That is, U.S. antitrust laws "must have a degree of clarity
which makes counseling reliable.. .so that counsellors can in fact en-
force the law through the advice they give."' 6 z Compliability is even
more important when the Federal Government proceeds against a for-
eign corporation whose home country's antitrust regime may differ
greatly from that of the U.S. 63
Rather than reasoned legal advice, the nation's top antitrust offi-
cials' recent public utterances on the subject of international antitrust
enforcement sound like a call to arms in the battle for global eco-
nomic domination.'6 That kind of talk fits with a spate of trade policy
material in applying the invention." Carbice Corp. of America v. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S.
27, 33-34 (1971).
159 Toughness of Clinton's Antitrust Policy is Questioned and Defended at Conference, Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Daily (BNA), at d3 (Oct. 25, 1994)(comments of Donald G. Kempf, Jr.).
160 See generally Charles Wolf, Jr., The New Mercantilism, 116 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 96, 97
(Summer 1994) ("Strategic trade policy focuses on international trade, on promoting specific
exports.. .[and includes].. .the use of threats and the imposition of penalties to pry open foreign
markets.").
161 KINGMAN BR.EwsITR, JR., Current Issues in Foreign Commerce Antitrust, in CURRENT Is-
SUES IN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUsr 23, 30 (Joseph P. Griffin ed., 1981).
162 Id.
163 For example, most countries, unlike the U.S., do not criminalize antitrust violations nor do
other nations share the U.S.'s view on per se treatment of certain offenses or the U.S. view on
market power definition. Starek Examines Pitfalls in International Enforcement, 67 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1674, at 136 (July 28, 1994).
164 See Bingaman, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing U.S. high definition television technology as
"winning the race" against rival Japanese and European systems and making a sports analogy to
the poor performance of the Boston Red Sox in the 1994 baseball season).
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books by Clinton administration officials urging the American public
to take heed of international economic competition lest America's
competitiveness be seriously undermined. 65 The unmistakable
message of the 1995 Guidelines' approach to subject matter jurisdic-
tion and the Department of Justice's action against Pilkington is that
U.S. antitrust policy will be employed whenever U.S. exporters need a
helping hand to combat a foreign country's restrictive practices. It
would appear that the Clinton administration would rather challenge
foreign anticompetitive practices in U.S. courtrooms, than through the
multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms of the GATT or WTO
which were expressly established for such purposes.
Equating antitrust policy with trade policy has both jurispruden-
tial weaknesses and big-picture policy weaknesses. On the judicial
side, the new policy runs the risk of stretching beyond its limits the
traditional notion of subject matter jurisdiction that was laid down
through nearly fifty years of antitrust jurisprudence. Additionally, it
makes U.S. courts the regulatory watchdog of any foreign market
closed to U.S. exporters. The rule on subject matter jurisdiction
should be that, where extraterritorial conduct and export foreclosure
is concerned, there must be an intent to reduce U.S. exports and a
clear demonstration of direct spilover in the U.S. economy: either
reduced supply or increased prices. Anything less puts Justice Depart-
ment officials in the role of trade negotiators whenever a U.S. export-
ers' toes are trampled on Overseas. U.S. v. Pilkington plc. is the
natural outcome of the 1995 Guidelines' attitude to subject matter ju-
risdiction; it is an instance of the U.S. Department of Justice policing
the worldwide oligopolistic flat glass market on behalf of two U.S.
manufacturers.
Furthermore, an antitrust policy fixated on bolstering U.S. export
in a particular industry is just the sort of "bad public policy" that Paul
Krugman, a wel known M.I.T. economist, warned about when he de-
nounced the national obsession with winning the international eco-
nomic war.166 An obsession with "winning" misconstrues the benefits
of free trade and undermines the liberal international trading regime
upon which postwar prosperity has been built. The long-term interests
165 See LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO's BASHING WHOM?: TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY INDuSTRIES (1992); IRA C. MAGAZINER and ROBERT B. REICH, MINDING
AMERICA'S BusiNESS: THE DECLINE AND RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1983); JEFFREY
E. GARTEN, A COLD PEACE: AMERICA, JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
SUPREMACY (1992).
166 Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, FOREIGN AFFArRs, March/
April 1994, at 28.
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of the United States are best served by free trade, and free trade is
enhanced when our trading partners believe that U.S. public regula-
tory law, including antitrust law, is compliable.
